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Europe in the World: Towards Perpetual Peace

The conventional view in most debates about international relations is that power is best understood in terms of deliberate, state-based capabilities. The most powerful actors in the international system, so runs the logic, are states that can act alone, that have large militaries, and that are willing to use hard power in the form of force, coercion, threats, and sanctions. Certainly, much of the history of the Westphalian state system seems to have borne this out, but in the contemporary era of globalization an alternative view has been gaining some traction, given its clearest illustration by the case of Europe. This emphasizes the role of civilian and soft power in international relations, and the ability of actors (including, but not limited to, states) to exert influence through incentives, encouragement, example, and ideas. Lacking statehood and a large unified military, the European Union is often disregarded as a major actor in international relations, but this has not prevented a widening debate over the qualities of European power, encouraging us to consider the possibilities of a European model of influence in the new global era.

There has been a particularly vigorous academic debate about Europe's qualities as a normative power, or one which projects power through ideas and ideology, and through influencing the formation and development of opinions, values, and norms. Hence Rosencrance concludes that 'Europe's attainment is normative rather than empirical', and that there is a paradox in the way in which 'the continent which once ruled the world through the physical impositions of imperialism is now coming to set world standards in normative terms'.[1] Manners develops this idea with his suggestion that the European Union is different from other political forms, that its construction on a normative basis 'predisposes it to act in a normative way in

world politics', and that 'the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is'.[2]

Almost everyone agrees that Europe's global role has changed since the end of the cold war, but almost everyone also agrees that its new role has not yet been translated into significant power or influence. Sceptics are quick to point to policy disagreements among European governments to Europe's lack of statehood, Europe's often marginal influence over responses to the world's most pressing security problems, the absence of a well-developed European common foreign and security policy, and the supposed lack of teeth behind that policy. They scoff that Europe has neither the military resources nor the level of political unity or conviction needed to be a true global power, that its positions on international issues are often more rhetorical than real, that it has for too long been a security consumer rather than a security producer, that it has become a global actor more by accident or default than by intention, and that it punches well below its economic weight. In debates about the prospects for new superpowers, Europe is routinely overlooked in favour of China and India, and even occasionally—and more remarkably—of Russia and Brazil.

But how we regard Europe as a global actor depends on how we understand power. If we continue to believe that it must rest on deliberate actions and be backed up by military capabilities, then true enough: there is little to impress or encourage in the European model. If, on the other hand, we acknowledge that the nature of power has changed in the era of globalization, and that control of the means of production is more important than control of the means of destruction, then the defining qualities of Europeanism become more clear; while realists place a premium on hard power and unilateralism, and emphasize national interests and security, the European model values soft power and multilateralism, and takes a liberal, post-modern view of the world that places a premium on globalization, diplomacy, and internationalism.[3] Europeans believe that states can and must cooperate and work together on matters of shared interest and highlight the importance of international organizations and international law. They long ago acknowledged that they are members of an international system, and while they are prepared to use threats and force to resolve problems where needed, they prefer to use diplomacy and to act by example. In short, Europeanism represents a redefinition of the dynamics of inter-state relations, projecting soft power options in a manner that raises questions about the value and efficacy of military power, and embracing the merits of positive peace.

Kantian Europe

Historically, Europe has been a region of almost constant war and violence. As noted in Chapter 1, there was rarely a time between the classical era and the end of the Second World War when one European power, state, community, or monarch was not at war with another or fending off an external invader, and life for residents of the region was routinely disrupted by often widespread and lengthy conflict: consider the death and destruction wrought by numerous Roman and Greek wars and campaigns, the Viking invasions, the Arab conquests, the Saxon wars, the Crusades, the Hundred Years' War (1337–1453), the struggle against the Ottoman Empire, numerous wars of religion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (including the Thirty Years' War, 1618–48), the Eighty Years' War (1568–1648), the Nine Years' War (1688–97), the Great Northern War (1700–21), the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–14), the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–8), the Seven Years' War (1754–63), the Napoleonic wars (1803–15), and the First and Second World Wars.

In the decades prior to the Second World War, the world's greatest imperial and military powers were European. They were adept at using hard power to build and maintain influence, to compete for resources, and to protect their political and economic interests. In spite of the general peace that reigned in Europe between 1871 and 1914, the major powers asserted themselves through the continued construction of empires, and through arms races that built the military capacities of Germany, France, and Russia while at the same time ensuring Britain's domination of the oceans. It has been estimated that between 1880 and 1914, German arms expenditure more than quintupled, British and Russian expenditure trebled, and French expenditure almost doubled.[4] By the time of the outbreak of the Great War, Germany had seventy divisions with 1.5 million soldiers mustered along its western border, and the French had an army of 800,000. With just one trained army of 160,000—the British Expeditionary Force—Britain was a relatively small player in terms of land forces, although it had a navy second to none.

But the human, political, and economic costs of two world wars—followed immediately by the threat of nuclear war—sparked a reassessment of principles, priorities, and methods. States still had their own foreign policy interests, Britain and France still had large militaries, and European leaders mainly fell in with their respective American and Soviet controllers during times of cold war tension. But Europeans had clearly tired of war and conflict,

and the general view after the Second World War was that all efforts possible should be directed at avoiding militarism and state-sponsored violence. Cold war struggles raised the constant possibility of fighting wars, but because the United States and the Soviet Union were the primary protagonists in those struggles, Europe—particularly western Europe—had the benefit of being able to focus on peacetime reconstruction rather then preparation for war. Democratic peace theory suggests that it is now almost inconceivable that European states will ever go to war with one another again, and where Europe was once one of the most violent regions on earth, it is today one of the most peaceful regions on earth, and the one that works hardest to project peaceful dispute resolutions internationally.

Europe's post-war evolution has pushed it closer than any other part of the world to achieving the condition of perpetual peace outlined by Kant (see Chapter 1). Europe does not yet have all the qualities he considered necessary: it still has standing armies, it is not a federation of free states, and not every European state has a republican constitution (defined by Kant as one making provision for a representative government with a separated executive and legislature). But no European peace treaties tacitly reserve the possibility of future war, no European states dominate their neighbours or attempt to project themselves onto other states, no national debts have been contracted with a view to the 'external friction of states', no states forcibly interfere with the constitutions of other states, the mutual confidence of states in a general European peace has long been established, there is almost free movement of people within the European Union, and the European Union is a league of nations.[5] Where Kant argued that the natural state of humans living side by side was one of war rather than peace (including not only open hostilities but the incessant threat of war), the natural state of today's Europe is one of peace rather than war. Europeans face external threats, to be sure, but they no longer threaten one another, nor do they pose a threat to others.

Kantian Europe stands in contrast to Hobbesian America or Russia. Writing at the time of the English Civil War, and 150 years before Kant, Thomas Hobbes argued in *Leviathan* that a strong central authority was required in order to avoid discord and war. In the state of nature that would exist without organized government, each person would feel that they had a right or licence to whatever they wanted, and in seeking either gain, safety, or reputation, men would engage in a 'war of all against all'. In order to address this problem, men should agree to a social contract with a sovereign authority to which individuals surrendered their natural rights in return for protection. But while individuals may have been able to resolve their

differences, no civil power existed between nations, which therefore had the same rights to protect themselves—including going to war with other nations—as individuals had possessed in the state of nature. It is difficult not to read Hobbes and to think of American and Soviet perceptions during the cold war, or of the foreign policies of George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin.

The Hobbesian–Kantian dichotomy was revisited in 2003 by Robert Kagan in his essay *Of Paradise and Power*, which contrasted Europe's new personality with that of the United States.[6] Europeans and Americans no longer shared a common view of the world, he argued, and on major strategic and international questions, Americans were from Mars and Europeans from Venus. While Europe was moving beyond power into a world of laws, rules, negotiation, and cooperation, and was realizing the Kantian ideal of perpetual peace, the United States remained 'mired in history, exercising power in an anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable, and where true security and the defence and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might'. This was not a transitory state of affairs, Kagan concluded, but was likely to endure. Most European intellectuals felt that the two sides no longer shared a 'strategic culture', and that the United States was dominated by a 'culture of death'. The United States was less patient with diplomacy, and saw the world as divided between good and evil, and between friends and enemies, while Europeans saw a more complex global system, and were more tolerant of failure, more patient, and preferred to negotiate and persuade rather than to coerce.

Controversy was sparked by Kagan's assertion that the differences do not arise naturally out of the character of Europeans and Americans, but are instead a reflection of the relative positions of the two actors in the world; their attitudes have been reversed as their roles have been reversed. When European states were great powers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and when nationalism coloured their views of one another, they were more ready to use violence to achieve their goals. But now that Europeans and Americans had traded places, they had also traded perspectives. When the United States was weak, argued Kagan, it used the strategies of the weak, but now that it was strong, it used the strategies of power.[7]

But what his argument does not explain is why Europeans have been so critical of the American use of force. It is not that Europeans do not use force because they have smaller armies than the Americans, but rather—notes Dworkin—that in the aftermath of the trauma of the Second World War they have 'turned away from foreign policies based on the pursuit of

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national interest and the balance of power', and have instead 'constructed a new legal order based on shared sovereignty and transparency'. It is not force that worries Europe so much as lawlessness, he argues: Europeans objected to US action in Iraq in 2003 not because they opposed the use of force, but because the United States was prepared to use force outside the law and without the clear backing of the UN Security Council; Europeans do not believe that hard power is unimportant, but rather that 'the use of military force is a blunt and destructive tool that should be used only as a last resort'.[8] Menon et al agree: Europeans, they argue, have not stumbled upon a new approach to international relations in which force plays only a limited role, but they have instead chosen deliberately to be militarily weak; Europe is not a continent of pacifists, but one where the 'just' causes of war are actively debated and where there are different opinions about the role of military force.[9]

Kagan was writing at a time of great turmoil in international relations, when the Bush administration was combatively pursuing its war on terrorism, painting the world in terms of good and evil, and arguing that the United States should be ready to use military force to encourage democratic change around the world, and be willing to downplay reliance on diplomacy, multilateralism, international organizations, and treaties. Against this uncompromising background, the Europeanist preference for diplomacy and multilateralism was much easier to identify, but the obvious question was whether Europe was different only from the America of Bush–Cheney neoconservatism or whether the principles of Europeanism pre-dated—and would outlive—the Bush administration. Time will almost certainly support the latter view: Europeans and Americans have long had a different view of the world, those differences re-emerged after the Second World War, they matured during the cold war, and they became more clear once the common project of opposing the Soviet Union had gone after 1991. The differences were made particularly clear by European criticism of the policies of the Reagan and Bush administrations, but this does not mean that they surface only during times of ideological disagreement with individual American administrations.

The post-war reinvention of Europe as a global actor has been slow and peppered with mistakes and false starts, upon which its critics have jumped with alacrity. Before the Second World War, it was national or state interests that prevailed over European interests, and western European states continued to act independently in the main until the late 1960s, when the six EEC member states agreed on European Political Cooperation (EPC), a process under which their foreign ministers would meet regularly to

coordinate policy.[10] The results were mixed at best, with the Community playing a modest role in the Middle East conflict and in the convening of the 1973 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and being marginalized in the response to the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Reflecting on progress in October 1981, the foreign ministers of the by then ten EEC member states noted that in a period of increased world tension and uncertainty the need for a coherent and united approach to international affairs by Community members was greater than ever. However, the ten were 'still far from playing a role in the world appropriate to their combined influence', and it was thus their conviction 'that the Ten should seek increasingly to shape events and not merely to react to them'.[11]

The European role has matured since then, thanks to a combination of the expanded powers and reach of the European Union, the role of the new European marketplace in transforming European global economic influence, the end of the cold war, Europe's emergence from playing second fiddle to the Americans and the Soviets, and the cumulative effects of a process of trial and error which have taught Europe what is necessary and possible. European Political Cooperation was replaced under the Maastricht treaty by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Its goals may have been vague—safeguarding the common values, fundamental interests, independence, and integrity of the European Union; strengthening the security of the European Union; preserving peace and strengthening international security; and promoting international cooperation—but it nonetheless established targets. It was given more focus in 1999 when the four external relations portfolios in the European Commission were combined into one, and a new post of High Representative for the CFSP was created. The latter may not have become the European foreign policy minister that many hoped for, but the creation of the post was a key step forward.

Even as the embarrassment of the 1991 Gulf War was still fresh in the minds of policy-makers, and the Community was about to trip up again in the Balkans, progress was being made on the security front. In 1992 the Petersberg tasks were agreed, stating that multinational European military forces could be used in humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping, and crisis management that might involve peacemaking only if necessary. Also in 1992 the Eurocorps was founded by France and Germany, and became operational as a 60,000-member joint defence force in 1995. Four years later the European Security and Defence Policy was launched, founded on the Petersberg tasks and on plans to create a 60,000-member European Rapid Reaction Force that could be deployed at sixty days' notice and sustained for at least one year in the field. It was to prove too ambitious,

however, because Europe lacked the necessary air and sea transport and logistical support; by 2004 the EU was talking instead of creating smaller battle groups that could be deployed at 15 days' notice and sustained between 30 and 120 days in the field.

Meanwhile, the European Security Strategy was adopted in 2003, hopefully declaring that the European Union was 'inevitably a global player', and that it 'should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security'. Arguing that large-scale aggression against an EU member state was now improbable, it listed the key international threats as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime. In contrast to the pervasive threats that had been posed by the cold war, noted the authors of the strategy, none of the new threats was 'purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means'. Instead, they concluded, a combination of political, economic, judicial, humanitarian, and military responses was needed, along with multilateral responses and 'an effective and balanced partnership with the USA'.[12]

There is a distinction to be made between negative peace, defined as a period when a war is neither imminent nor actually being fought, and positive peace, where the ordering of politics, economics, and society makes war unthinkable.[13] For much of its history, Europe has had to live with negative peace; alliances and the need to keep a watchful eye on the balance of power meant that Europeans long lived with the strong prospect of conflict or war, even during times of what seemed like extended peace. Today, war and the prospect of war are both considered unacceptable by most Europeans. Where war was once a means of uniting Europeans, today it is peace—or the abhorrence of war—that offers Europeans their best prospect of unity. It is telling that when asked in a 2008 poll to choose the value that they personally held most important, more Europeans opted for peace (45 per cent) than for human rights (42 per cent), respect for human life (41 per cent), democracy (27 per cent), individual freedom (21 per cent), and equality (19 per cent).[14]

The European abhorrence of war has combined with the habit-forming cooperation of the post-war era to establish the European Union as a new kind of international actor, based on a set of principles that give Europeanism a distinctive character and that have fundamentally changed the way in which business on international affairs is now pursued by Europeans, including those not yet within the European Union. Three principles, in particular, define the global perspective of Europeanism: a preference for the use of civilian power over military power, a belief in the merits of smart

power over hard power, and support for multilateralism and for addressing problems through international laws and institutions. Realists influenced by the cold war view of the international system continue to find it hard to accept that these qualities have much more than a supporting role to play in the international arena. But Europeanists—and the emerging model of European power—suggest otherwise.

Civilian power Europe

In the ongoing debate about American power in the world, and about the prospects for Chinese power, the emphasis given to military resources tends to negate claims that Europe is a significant global actor. And yet Europe is well armed and equipped: data compiled by the International Institute for Strategic Studies find that Europe's forty states among them have nearly two million active service personnel (more than the United States), backed up by 12,000 artillery pieces, about 3,700 combat aircraft, more than 160 surface naval vessels (including five aircraft carriers, with four more on order), and more than 80 submarines (including eight tactical nuclear submarines).[15] If Europe had a unified command system, a single defence budget, and a common security policy, the European Union would be widely acknowledged as a military superpower. But even without that unity, the European military establishment—if measured by spending, personnel, firepower, and deployment capabilities, and given that China is less a global than a regional military power, and that the Russian military is currently in disarray—is the second-most powerful in the world after that of the United States.

Furthermore, individual European states are not unwilling to use their militaries: Britain and France have been engaged in multiple conflicts since 1945 (including Korea, Indochina, Malaya, Suez, Aden, Northern Ireland, the Falklands, Lebanon, the Gulf, the Balkans, Rwanda, Haiti, Iraq, and Afghanistan) and almost every EU member state—even the neutrals, such as Finland, Ireland, and Sweden—have committed troops to European, NATO, or UN peacekeeping operations. In 2007–9, all twenty-seven member states—along with eight European non-member states—had military personnel serving in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (although the numbers were often quite small, and the role they played was sometimes quite modest). Also, EU forces have been deployed to (mainly peacekeeping) operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Chad, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. And

the European Union launched its first joint naval operation in December 2008 when it sent a flotilla of ships to deal with piracy off the coast of Somalia. A small step, to be sure, but one with much significance.

In spite of all this, Europe now sees itself—and is mainly seen by others—as a civilian power. It poses a military threat to no one; it faces no immediate conventional military threats of its own, and it does not feel the need to use force or the threat of force to encourage change; instead, it offers the incentive of opportunities. It meets Maull's definition of a civilian power as one that prefers to focus on non-military and mainly economic means to achieve its goals, leaving the military as a residual safeguard, and emphasizing the importance of cooperation (rather than conflict) and of developing supranational structures to deal with critical international problems.[16] It also reflects the four main qualities of civilian power described by Smith: using economic, diplomatic, and cultural instruments to achieve objectives; preferring international cooperation, solidarity, and strengthening the rule of law; preferring the use of persuasion; and emphasizing democratic civilian control over foreign and defence policy-making.[17]

The possibilities of civilian power were recognized by NATO as long ago as 1956, when it acknowledged that security was more than a military matter, and that the strengthening of political consultation and economic cooperation, the development of resources, and progress in education and public understanding could all be 'as important, or even more important, for the protection of the security of a nation, or an alliance, as the building of a battleship or the equipping of an army'.[18] The European Community seemed to be following this logic when in 1970—at the launch of the process of European Political Cooperation—its leaders argued that a united Europe had the potential to promote international relations 'on a basis of trust'.[19]

The notion of civilian power was explored in 1972–3 by François Duchêne, who felt that nuclear competition had devalued purely military power and given more scope to civilian forms of influence and action.[20] Writing against the background of Vietnam, he suggested that the lack of military power was not the handicap that it once was, and that western Europe might become 'the first major area of the Old World where the age-old process of war and indirect violence could be translated into something more in tune with the twentieth-century citizen's notion of civilized politics'. Europe's influence should not be wielded along traditional lines, he argued; there was no point in trying to build a European superpower because it would need to be a nuclear, centralized state with a strong sense of collective nationalism, and the lack of military power could

be an advantage for Europe because it promised to remove suspicions about European intentions and might allow it to act as an unbiased moderator. Military power should not be ignored, but Europe should avoid trying to achieve military dominance, and should instead try to act as a model of a new kind of inter-state arrangement that could overcome war, intimidation, and violence. It should be a force for the diffusion of civilian and democratic standards, Duchêne concluded, otherwise it might itself become the victim of a political agenda determined by stronger powers.

Such arguments were rejected in 1982 by Hedley Bull, who dismissed the concept of 'civilian power Europe' as a contradiction in terms, and argued that the capabilities of great powers were likely to be defined indefinitely by their military resources. The European Community, he argued, needed to become more self-sufficient in defence and security, for three main reasons: the divergence of transatlantic interests, the threat posed by the Soviet Union, and the need to remove obstacles to its own regeneration by removing its dependence on the United States. Rather than becoming a civilian power, western Europe needed to build its nuclear and conventional forces, allow West Germany to play a more positive role in western European security, develop a Europeanist approach to defence, and pursue careful coexistence with the Soviets and the Americans.[21]

But Bull's conclusions are not that surprising given the times in which he was writing: cold war tensions were high, the European Community was in the political and economic doldrums, the USSR was suffering under the unimaginative and conservative leadership of Leonid Brezhnev, the still relatively new Reagan administration was making Europeans nervous with its apparent escalation of the cold war, and no one could know that within eight years the USSR would collapse and the cold war would end. Twenty-five years on, the world is a quite different place: the cold war is over, Europe has been transformed, globalization has taken hold, and security threats have become less direct, more vague, and less open to military solutions. We may be living in what Dandeker describes as an era of 'unstable violent peace',[22] but Bull's arguments about why Europe needs to become more self-sufficient in defence no longer hold so true: the divergence of transatlantic interests has seen Europe moving further along the path to civilian power, the Soviet Union no longer exists (even if Russia still poses a threat of its own), and the level of European dependence upon the United States has declined.

We are also living in an era in which more questions are being asked about the utility of military power: it is costly to maintain, it diverts resources away from other more valuable uses, the doubts about the value

of major war are numerous and troubling,[23] and the maintenance and use of force—rather than resolving disputes—often creates its own new problems. We have only to look at US policy in the Middle East, or Israeli policy towards Palestine, to see that those who feel threatened by force are more likely to resort to violence themselves than to capitulate. The Soviet Union built its enormous military in large part because it felt threatened first by the German and then by the American military machine, and why else would North Korea or Iran want to build nuclear programmes other than because they feel threatened by American power, or because they want a bargaining chip in their dealings with the United States? Certainly there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that these programmes are intended to be offensive. And as for the modern rise of international terrorism, it is best seen as an expression of the frustration with great power politics felt among the poor and the disenfranchised, hence the adage that war is terrorism by the rich while terrorism is war by the poor.

The rifts in the Atlantic alliance that have waxed and waned since 1945 have been placed under additional stress by the growing independence of European views on security. Bailes argues that with the weakening of the exclusive nature of US–European ties since the end of the cold war, it has become clear that Europe has strategic values of its own, including a multilateral and multifunctional approach to global problems, a preference for minimizing and legitimizing the use of force, and a readiness to absorb past enemies.[24] These values are reflected in the pronouncements of political leaders. Thus, in response to the 1986 US bombing of Libya following a terrorist incident, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl commented that 'force is not a promising way of dealing with things'.[25] As the war on terrorism moved into high gear in 2003, French foreign minister Dominique de Villepin was moved to note that 'there is no military solution to terrorism. You need to have a political strategy'.[26]

European strategic values are reflected in the results of public opinion surveys. A Eurobarometer poll carried out in 2000 in the EU-15 asked Europeans which threats they feared most, and found the list topped by organized crime, an accident at a nuclear plant, and terrorism, each identified by 74–7 per cent of respondents. Meanwhile, military threats were identified by only 44–5 per cent of respondents. By 2008, war had slipped even further down the list; when asked which they thought was the most serious problem facing the world, 68 per cent identified poverty, 62 per cent climate change, 53 per cent international terrorism, and just 38 per cent armed conflict. Europeans expressed high levels of trust in the military in 2000, and high levels of support for the creation of a European Rapid

Reaction Force, but were also clear about how they felt a European army should be used: 71 per cent said it should be used for the defence of the territory of the EU, and 63 per cent for guaranteeing peace in the European Union, while only 18 per cent believed that it should intervene in conflicts in other parts of the world.[27]

Similarly, a 2002 survey in six European countries (Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland) found that while Europeans were concerned about terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and favoured the European Union playing a more global role alongside the United States, they placed more weight on non-military approaches to international problems, regarding them as more important and possibly more effective. When asked whether they thought economic strength or military strength played a more important role in determining a country's power and influence in the world, large majorities (80–9 per cent) opted for economic strength. When asked under what circumstances they would support the use of European troops, more opted for helping out in areas struck by famine or upholding international law (80–8 per cent) than for bringing peace to a region beset by civil war (72 per cent) or ensuring the supply of oil (49 per cent).[28]

Interestingly, public opinion in the United States—which might be expected to be more favourable to military action overseas than is the case in Europe—has recently been equivocal at best. In cases where the United States is seen to have only a modest stake in the outcome of a problem (as in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, or Kosovo in the 1990s), there are low levels of support for using ground troops in combat. But in regard to the war on terrorism, there is both majority support for military action and a high level of tolerance for high casualties.[29] An important determinant of the level of support for military force is the nature of the objective: American public opinion supports restraining aggressive adversaries, but is leery of involvement in civil wars, and is sensitive to the relative risk of different military actions, to the prospect of civilian or military casualties, to multilateral participation in the mission, and to the likelihood of success or failure of the mission.[30]

War and conflict continue to be realities that must be faced, and Europe continues to maintain a large military against the possibility that it will be needed for the security of Europe, for peacekeeping operations abroad, and even occasionally for peacemaking.[31] But while militaries are still important to the state identity of the United States, Russia, China, and India, and play an important role in the politics of numerous less developed countries, the role of the military in the European psyche has declined markedly since

1945. Civilian power Europe might have been a contradiction in terms in 1982, but today it is a core element of the meaning of Europeanism. The purpose of the military has been redefined; from a time when European armies regularly fought with each other, the European military today is mainly kept in reserve, sustained by the need for humanitarian and peace-keeping operations, and redefined as an international force for the promotion of democratic principles, rather than as a force for the projection of European power.

Smart power Europe

Recent debates about Europe's global role have made much of its association with soft power, meaning the ability to employ military, economic, diplomatic, and cultural tools in such a way as to encourage, attract, and lead by example. Although the concept is usually associated with the writings of Harvard political scientist Joseph Nye, in fact it is as old as organized society, and contemporary assessments can be traced back at least to the early 1970s, when Klaus Knorr made a distinction between two kinds of influence: coercive (where a state uses sanctions or the threat of restrictions against another state, and one loses or expects to lose while the other state gains) and non-coercive (where a state's choices are 'enriched rather than limited' by another state, and both states expect to gain).[32] At about the same time, Steven Lukes suggested that studies of power were too focused on observable behaviour and concrete decisions, and that perhaps it was time to look also at latent or covert power, or the way in which states could influence, shape, or determine the wants of other states. Put another way, strength, magnetism, wealth, and diplomatic skills might provide a state with power even when they were not deployed.[33]

This idea of non-coercive, latent, or covert power was given a new name and has attracted new attention since the 1990s as Nye's concept of 'soft power'. Nye contrasted the threats and inducements tied to military and economic power with the outcomes achieved by using intangible assets such as culture, political values, and policies that are seen as legitimate or as having moral authority. Soft power, Nye argues, is attractive power, providing leadership by example, shaping the preferences of others, co-opting rather than coercing, and encouraging others to want the outcomes you want.[34] Lacking a large unified military and the ability and willingness to take military action quickly and decisively, while at the same time being driven by the economic priorities of the civilian–industrial complex discussed in Chapter 5,

the European Union has come to be associated with soft power. Meanwhile, the enormous military power of the United States, combined with the political influence of its military–industrial complex, brands it in the minds of many as a hard power. But the hard–soft power dichotomy is too stark; more useful as a means of grasping what Europe now represents is the idea that neither soft power nor hard power can be relied upon in isolation, but that the key lies in using them both in combination, through what has come to be known as smart power.

Nossel traces the roots of this idea to Wilsonian liberal internationalism, and defines it as assertive leadership using a combination of diplomatic, economic, and military means to advance a broad array of goals, including human rights, free trade, and economic development. While conservatives 'rely on military power as the main tool of statecraft', she asserts, 'liberal internationalists see trade, diplomacy, foreign aid, and the spread of... values as equally important'.[35] But she was making an appeal to American progressives to revive liberal internationalism as a means of articulating a distinct alternative to conservative views of the world, and while Joseph Nye has since championed the concept of smart power, and Hillary Clinton raised it several times during her confirmation hearings as Secretary of State in January 2009, it had already been at the heart of European calculations for many years.

The suggestion that Europeans have either a soft or a smart power advantage is routinely rejected by realists, who argue that Europe can achieve little in an anarchic world unless it is able and willing to maintain and deliver the military force needed to back up its economic interests. American critics in particular equate European soft power with weakness, pointing to a 'tradition' of appeasement running from Munich in 1938 to Iraq in 2003. They assert that Europe's advantages in this area are almost entirely reliant on the insurance provided by American security guarantees; without a large US military, they argue, Europe would not be in the position to take the moral high ground. They list the many instances where European soft power has not worked or has failed to make much difference, including Afghanistan, Iran, Israel, and Lebanon. They also argue that Europe has quietly exploited anti-Americanism to extend its soft power credentials, contrasting its 'good cop' reliance on peace and economic incentives with the 'bad cop' role of the United States. Soft power, argues the conservative American military historian Victor Davis Hanson, translates into Europe 'using transnational organizations and its own economic clout to soothe or buy off potential adversaries, while a formidable cultural engine dresses it all up in high sounding platitudes of internationalism and multilateralism'.

Meanwhile, he asserts, most of the 'international sins of the recent age . . . were the work of European avatars of peace'.[36]

And yet the absence of a threat of violence from Europe, combined with the considerable economic opportunities that Europe can offer, may well encourage some of those adversaries to be more receptive to its suggestions than to those of the United States. Moravcsik argues that 'Europe can win without an army', and that talk about European defence schemes 'distract Europe from its true comparative advantage in world politics: the cultivation of civilian and quasi-military power'. He lists five ways in which he feels that Europe can wield a level of influence over peace and war as great as that of the United States: through the promise of membership of the European Union, through continuing to provide the lion's share of official development assistance, through continuing to bolster international peacekeeping operations, through support for monitoring by international institutions, and through continuing to champion multilateral responses to crises. Rather than criticizing US military power or hankering after it, he concludes, Europe should instead invest in complementing that power.[37]

In better understanding the significance and possibilities of smart power, three key principles must be borne in mind. First, military power is not necessarily hard, except where violence or the threat of violence is used to achieve an objective. The Europeans clearly have a large military, and defence spending has increased in several European states in recent years, but European military efforts are directed mainly at humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, which are soft power activities. Military power is only hard where the states that control it threaten to use it offensively, or are so belligerent in the way they define its defensive capacities that they are seen to pose a threat to others.

Second, even though the United States is often characterized as placing more emphasis on hard than soft power, and it has been adept in its use of the latter. The democratic ideals it espouses have long been inspirational, and it was the principal architect behind many of the international institutions that the Bush administration treated with so little regard. American culture helps promote American influence, and the United States has made notable contributions to humanitarian efforts, ranging from the Marshall Plan of the 1950s through to the international response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. Indeed, the United States is often not given credit for its application of soft opportunities, a problem that lies in large part in how the US role in the world is perceived by its enemies.

Finally, it is essential to note that in spite of its civilian and soft power credentials, Europe is both willing and able to use hard power where

necessary. Its military actions were noted earlier in this chapter, but it has also employed hard options on the economic front. Thus more than two dozen countries were targeted by EU sanctions between 1982 and 2004, including Afghanistan, Argentina, Belarus, China, Croatia, Indonesia, Nigeria, and South Africa.[38] Meanwhile, the European Union has been active in taking its trading partners to the World Trade Organization in order to protect what it defines as its best economic interests. Just as the United States is often wrongly disparaged for talking loudly and carrying a small carrot (to mix metaphors), so Europe is often wrongly disparaged for talking softly and carrying a big carrot. The difference between the two actors lies in their relative use of coercion and encouragement to achieve their foreign policy goals.

Often touted as the shining example of European soft power at work has been the record of the European Union in reaching out to its neighbours. Although the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community was met with little enthusiasm outside the six founding states, European integration steadily exerted an irresistible attraction, such that all forty European states today except Belarus are either members of the club or have short-term aspirations to join. EU enlargement, argues Moravcsik, is 'perhaps the single most powerful policy instrument for peace and security in the world today'.[39] And for those states that do not qualify for membership of the European Union, access to the European market exerts almost as much influence. In reviewing the impact of Europe on its neighbours, Leonard notes that 'the European idea of democracy has not travelled in armoured convoys from the west. It is an ideal that inspires people to change themselves from the inside'.[40] All new or aspiring members have made institutional or policy changes that have strengthened their democratic and capitalist credentials. Thus while it was US leadership in the cold war that kept western Europe safe and prosperous, it has been European leadership that has since taken up the burden of providing opportunities and solidifying the gains.

A second example of European soft power has been its role in peacekeeping and peacebuilding. If the former is understood as a military deployment to keep warring factions apart or to monitor a ceasefire, the latter consists of military or civilian interventions aimed at creating effective security, police, and judicial institutions in the interests of transforming war-torn states into stable market democracies.[41] Europe provides more than 40 per cent of the budget for UN peacekeeping operations, far more than anyone else (the United States provides 26 per cent, Japan 17 per cent, and China 3 per cent), and while the vast majority of uniformed personnel in those

operations in recent years have come from Asia and Africa, several European states have made their own large personnel contributions, including Italy, France, and Spain.[42] Since a commitment made in 2000, the European Union has also been working on a civilian crisis management force made up of members of national police forces; the first two EU police missions were set up in Bosnia and Macedonia in 2003, and in 2006 the European Gendarmerie Force was inaugurated, sending its first mission to Chad in 2008.

A third example of European soft power can be found in its role as the world's foremost supplier of official development assistance (ODA). There are many questions about the effectiveness of aid, it is true, and about how much it is undermined by the unfair trading practices of industrialized countries, but there is little question that it has contributed strongly to development progress, and that some ODA is preferable to none at all. In absolute terms, Europe (the European Union, Norway, and Switzerland) accounted for 64 per cent of net ODA provided by OECD member states in 2008, compared to the 22 per cent provided by the United States, and the 8 per cent provided by Japan (see Fig 8.1). It also does well in relative terms: in 1970, the UN General Assembly set a target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income (GNI) for donor countries, the only ones of which to


Figure 8.1 Official development assistance

Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development at http://www.oecd.org/dac (retrieved September 2009). Figures are for 2008.

have so far met that target being Norway, Sweden, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Denmark, while eight more European countries are at least half-way to the target. Japan and the United States meanwhile give less than 0.2 per cent of GNI.[43] While apologists argue that the United States makes up for its shortfall with private philanthropy, the addition of private spending only pushes the US total up to 0.21 per cent of GNI,[44] and an estimated 40 per cent of private American spending goes to just one country: Israel.[45]

European aid also comes with relatively few political strings, and is directed primarily at civilian activities. Smith notes that the European Union prefers to use 'positive conditionality' in its aid policies, meaning that it encourages changes in the states with which it deals, promising benefits to those states in return for meeting conditions.[46] By contrast, a third of American ODA goes to just three countries (Iraq, Egypt, and Israel), 20–30 per cent of its aid (as noted in Chapter 5) is in the form of military assistance, and states with which the United States has an ideological difference of opinion—most notably Cuba—are denied American assistance. And while the Bush administration allocated $15 billion to the global fight against AIDS, it stipulated that the spending should be channelled to programmes that promoted abstinence rather than condom use, and that it could not be used for abortions or to treat prostitutes. It also refused to allow ODA to be used by groups that carried out or provided advice on abortions. True, this was an ideological decision that was reversed by the Obama administration, but it had greater support among conservative Americans than a similar policy would have had among conservative Europeans.

A final example of European soft power at work can be seen in its influence as an organizational model. The European Economic Community was the first attempt of the post-war era to promote regional integration, and has gone on to be the most successful. Other experiments in regional integration have followed in its wake, including the Council of Arab Economic Unity (1957), the Latin American Free Trade Association (1960), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (1967), the East African Community (1967), the Caribbean Community and Common Market (1973), the Economic Community of West African States (1975), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (1985), the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur) (1991), and the North American Free Trade Agreement (1994). In 2002, the African Union replaced the Organization of African Unity, and borrowed directly from the EU model, with its own equivalents of the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice, the European Council, the

Committee of Permanent Representatives, and the European Central Bank. Not all these experiments have worked well, and some have even been disbanded, but the European Union has unquestionably been the pace-setter on the concept of regional integration.

Although there are several compelling examples of European soft power at work, Europe has become adept at balancing the stick and the carrot in such a way as to be better understood as a smart power. As noted, it will use military and economic threats where needed, but it prefers to avoid conflict and instead to pursue encouragement and cooperation. 'The great value of Europe's approach to international affairs', argues Everts, 'is that it seeks to create intensive webs of reciprocal obligations and exchange with other countries ... [and] also tries to boost the capacity of international regimes to tackle new issues'. On a range of issues, from climate change to Iran, the International Criminal Court, landmines, and bio-weapons, 'the EU approach has produced real results—often in the face of US indifference and, sometimes, opposition'.[47] The possibilities of European smart power are not yet fully understood, because they have been so little studied and because we are still disinclined to define power in terms of the ambiguities of opportunity and example. But the drawbacks of hard power continue to mount, and the nature of international relations continues to change, obliging new attention to be paid to Europeanist values.

Multilateralism

The European Security Strategy included a call for an international order based on 'effective multilateralism', a phrase that sparked something of a minor firestorm of academic and political debate. If multilateralism is the philosophy that states should work together rather than in isolation, then—whether they work through direct intergovernmental contacts or through international organizations—the keys to effective multilateralism are rules, cooperation, and inclusiveness, and the building of a sustainable consensus among states.[48] Since the European Union is by definition a multilateral institution, Europeans are quite familiar with most of its possibilities and pitfalls. European institutions have had decades of experience of trial and error, and a proven track record of managing power rivalries among states, of encouraging states to work together on agreeing new laws and policies, and of making efforts to be inclusive and to engage. The results have not always been ideal, to be sure, but to the extent that we learn from our mistakes, Europeans have had much opportunity to learn.

Much of Kagan's thesis on Europe and America rests on what he regards as their differing attitudes towards international cooperation. 'Americans increasingly tend toward unilateralism in international affairs', he notes. 'They are less inclined to act through international institutions such as the United Nations, less likely to work cooperatively with other nations to pursue common goals, more sceptical about international law, and more willing to operate outside its strictures when they deem it necessary, or even merely useful'. By contrast, he claims, Europeans are quicker to appeal to international law, international conventions, and international opinion.[49] However, the reality is not quite that simple. On the economic front, multilateralism has been at the heart of the international financial and trading system that has been built with such care since 1945, while on the political front it has been promoted by the principles of the United Nations and a complex network of other international organizations, and by the construction of a system of international laws and treaties that are, by definition, multilateral in character. Thus Americans and Europeans have been subject to similar pressures. This does not mean, however, that they have approached the construction of the post-war system from similar philosophical positions, and in two areas in particular they have clearly been moving in different directions.

First, while American leaders since 1945 have had a tendency to see the world through a realist lens and to see threats in sometimes surprising places, their European counterparts have placed a premium on cooperation, and on the promotion of values rather than of interests. In their approach to numerous problems, including terrorism, arms control, nonproliferation, international trade, the environment, and human rights, Americans have emphasized self-interest while Europeans have worked to be more inclusive. On international terrorism, in particular, the contrasts are clear. While American neoconservatives have led a chorus of arguments that terrorists choose to strike because they envy the West and its freedoms, and that the only viable response is to meet violence with violence, Europeans have been more inclined to seek out the underlying causes of terrorism. These may include criticism over the actions of Israel in the face of Palestinian demands for a state, the stationing of US troops in Saudi Arabia, or frustration among western European Muslims about their alienation. Whatever the cause, however, there are few Europeans who would advocate only a military response.

Second, the two sides have had a fundamentally different perception not only of the place and utility of military power but also of how the military should best be used. Above all, Europeans have been deeply reluctant to use

their militaries other than in situations for which an international man-date—preferably one arranged through the United Nations—has been achieved. The British and the French in particular remember the interna-tional condemnation attracted by their venture into Suez in 1956, and the implications first of their failure to arrange international support for the invasion, and then of the political and financial pressure brought to bear by the United States. The United States not only has worked to build multina-tional coalitions wherever possible, as in Korea and during the 1990–1 Gulf crisis, but has also indicated its willingness to deploy its military even in the face of international opposition. Its lonely war against the North Vietnam-ese is a case in point, and another is offered by its willingness to invade Iraq in 2003 with or without the backing of the UN, and thus of the interna-tional community.

As the United States prepared in the opening months of 2003 to launch the invasion, most EU states rejected the idea of war without the backing of a UN Security Council resolution, and the Greek presidency issued a state-ment arguing that war was not inevitable, that 'force should be used only as a last resort', that it was 'committed to the United Nations remaining at the centre of the international order,' and that it believed the 'the primary responsibility for dealing with Iraqi disarmament lies with the [UN] Securi-ty Council'. Once the invasion was under way, the European Union de-manded a central role for the UN in the rebuilding of Iraq. Indeed, the EU–UN relationship has become a key feature in the dynamics of international relations, Eide going so far as to suggest that the European Union is 'in many ways becoming the UN's main Western partner'.[50]

Patrick describes the American view on multilateralism as ambivalent at best, which he puts down to three particular features of the American experience: the belief that the United States is an exceptional society that is not only the one outlier on the rules that apply to other societies, but must also stand as an example and either encourage others to follow its lead or else go it alone; its domestic institutional structure, with the mandate shared between president and Congress making it harder for the United States to assume multilateral obligations; and its sheer power, which makes it more inclined to lead than to cooperate, and to pursue self-interest where needed.[51] On all the three counts, the European view is markedly different: there is no longer a prevailing sense of European exceptionalism, nor a sense that Europe has a mission to change others in its image; parliamenta-ry government makes it easier for executives to win the support of legisla-tures for new treaties or strong positions in international organizations; and Europe's self-doubt about its power has combined with its habit of

often conceding leadership to the Americans, and with the effects of the programme of European regional integration, to encourage it to work to achieve a consensus rather than rocking the boat.

European leaders are quite familiar with the adage that united we stand, divided we fall; not only is cooperation essential to the mission of regional integration, but the only way European states can really hope to influence the United States, China, or Russia is if they work together. And yet it has only been relatively recently, notes Maull, that the European Union has paid much attention to thinking through how multilateralism can best be promoted at a global level, the key qualification for success, he believes, being the ability to form and sustain broad-based coalitions.[52] For Brenner, effective multilateralism requires not only broad international support and legitimacy, but also the capacity to generate initiatives, and the political leadership to set the agenda, define deadlines, mobilize resources, and promote effective implementation.[53] As the tradition of European cold war deference to external powers fades into history, so the European Union in particular is showing its willingness and capacity to pursue all these qualities.

Additional evidence for European support of multilateralism can be found in Europe's role in the work of the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, NATO, and other international organizations, and in European support for international treaties. Supporting multilateral cooperation is 'a basic principle' of EU foreign policy, declared the European Commission in 2003, and the UN is regarded as the core channel for pursuit of that principle: the European Union should consider itself a 'driving force' in pursuing UN initiatives on sustainable development, poverty reduction, and international security (while also giving new impetus to UN reform).[54] Eide argues that one of the EU's greatest strengths in recent years has been 'its ability to co-opt, enhance and gradually reshape other international organizations'. After having seemed to be at odds with many of those organizations in the 1990s, he suggests, it has since come to be accepted as a positive force by reworking the capacities and goals of bodies such as NATO, the African Union, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. These advances 'have given the EU a strategic reach far greater than its . . . assets warrant'.[55]

The political reach of Europeanist methods and values is routinely underrated in large part because we live in a world where military power is still seen to trump other forms of power, in spite of the mounting evidence of the pitfalls of military options. We also still tend to see power in terms of state interests, and since states have a near-monopoly over the

maintenance and deployment of military power, we find it hard to appreciate the possibility that suprastate arrangements might exert significant influence. Multilateralism, in particular, because it demands international agreement and thus the watering down of state positions in the interests of reaching collective agreement, is portrayed by hawks as weakness and as the start of the slippery slope to appeasement. But the new dynamics of the international system, in which interests are defined less in state or territorial terms, and increasingly in collective terms, fits centrally with—and has been most actively promoted by—Europeanist perceptions about the most effective means for managing and deploying influence. Those means place the emphasis on the tools needed to achieve a democratic and positive peace.