**Position Paper**

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**I. Background Introduction**

The European Union represents a uniquely successful endeavor to overcome rivalries, disputes, and wars among its members. It has been one of the world's most powerful as well as influential capitalist democracy in the late 20th century. Especially in low politics such as agriculture, industry, technology, education, trade, and currencies, the EU has reached a high degree of integration. And the process of European integration for half a century has enabled member states to enjoy unprecedented security, freedom, and prosperity. However, during the last decades, in the aftermath of Brexit and Trump administration, the EU integration seems to have stalled a bit, and some parties have gradually turned into pessimism about the prospects of the EU.

As the final goal of the EU’s integration, a consolidated defense system has been pursued for many years since the formation of European Political Co-operation(EPC). But in terms of defense, when it touches the core interests of member states’ sovereignty, of which negotiations are not easy to settle regarding its sensitivity and particularity. After the end of the Cold War and Community's failure to prevent the war in former Yugoslavia, European defense integration began to gain momentum. Almost a decade after its adoption in the Lisbon Treaty, Member States have launched the permanent structured cooperation (PeSCo) to reaffirm their commitment to European defense.

Spain has always been a strong supporter of the European integration process in general and of the development of a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in particular. Spain’s political and social support for EU integration presents itself as a strategic culture that tends to frame relevant Spanish defense policy decisions in multilateral -especially European- frameworks, to avoid controversies that could threaten the baseline consensus on defense matters throughout the European decision-making process. Accordingly, and despite the stagnation of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in general and PeSCo in particular, Spain has been involved in successive attempts to relaunch and deepen European defense. As of March 2018, Spain leads one project (system of command and control for CSDP missions/operations), participates in 11 projects (military mobility, medical command, maritime surveillance, port surveillance, energy operational function, logistics hubs, EUFOR CROC, training mission competence, cyber response teams, cyber information sharing and disaster relief capability) and is observer to 5 (secure software defined radio, training certification, maritime drones, land vehicles and indirect fire support). In the operational field, Spain is the only country that has participated in all EU missions/operations and one of the countries that contributes the most troops (30%), commanding a dozen missions over the last decade.

Spain’s interest in PeSCo stems from the double expectation that it will allow European defense to advance and that Spain will be part of the vanguard of countries that make the decisions. Spain saw the Franco-German PeSCo proposal as an opportunity to unlock the Common Defense and Security Policy (CSDP) and progress towards European integration. Regardless of PeSCo’s final outcome, it was an opportunity to seize the momentum and take a “historic” step towards a common defense, a lesson learned by Spain as a pioneer of enhanced cooperation initiatives such as Schengen and the euro.

The United Kingdom’s exit from the EU, which represents more than 25% of the total defense expenditure of the entire European Union gone, will leave Germany and France covering half of the European defense spending. This enabled Spain to approach the core of European defense. Until then, it barely influenced decision-making processes under the control of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. The Brexit reinforced Franco-German leadership, although both countries soon discovered that they needed the agreement of other close collaborators if they wanted to mobilize a sufficient number of Member States to achieve a higher level of autonomy and ambition for the CSDP and PeSCo more specifically. Accordingly, and despite the stagnation of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in general and PeSCo in particular, Spain has been involved in successive attempts to relaunch and deepen European defense.

The Spanish Government became aware that it would be forced to increase its role in the EU. The Foreign Affairs Minister, Alfonso Dastis, declared in November 2016 that Spain wanted to be within the core of countries “at the forefront of European defense". In a March 2017 meeting with the leaders of France, Germany, Italy, and Spain at the Palace of Versailles, President Mariano Rajoy highlighted Spain’s goodwill when he stated that Spain was "prepared to go even further in terms of integration, alongside those who want to continue in this integration process”

Consequently, the Defense Minister of Spain met with her colleagues from Germany, France, and Italy on the sidelines of the Franco-German Council of 13 July 2017 to define PeSCo’s common principles in a joint letter with the support of other European countries. 6 Spain’s entry into PeSCo’s core led to the country playing a greater role in its development. For instance, prior to the December 2017 Joint Notification, Spain took part in the preparation of the guiding principles, the access criteria, and PeSCo governance.

**II. Summary**

The EU has made a lot of efforts in foreign policy, but it needs to be coordinated with a military policy in the process of integration. Without the integrated defense system, the EU will lose some diplomatic negotiating capabilities as an independent international political entity. As far as the internal environment is concerned, peace within the EU, which is basically free of armed conflict, has been basically achieved. This grants the establishment of EU military cooperation with some possibilities. In terms of the external environment, first of all, it is a geopolitical threat. The increasingly unstable international environment around Europe poses new challenges for the EU to respond to non-traditional security threats. Secondly, it is no longer secure for the EU to rely on external forces for defense in the long run. The past three years have witnessed the growing trend of isolationism of the United States on global security issues. Hence, the European Union have to react to the potential decrease of US military assistance or potential cost increase in keeping the US's military presence. It must bear the risk of cost fluctuations. Thus, it is high time for the EU to strengthen its military capacity by building a European Army.

**III. Spain’s Proposal**

The delegation of Spain believes that it is necessary and urgent to start a discussion on EU defense cooperation. Establishing a European army responsible for the security of the European Union is the essential step of the cooperation. Thus this delegation proposes the following:

1. To set up a multilateral conversation framework with appropriate personnel in which the following issues could be discussed and settled regularly:

1) The component of the European army;

2) The command of the army;

3) The initial scale and the potential expansion process of the army;

4) The military assets granted by European Union member states;

5) Any other technical issue that may be settled in the framework.

The kingdom of Spain welcomes all forms of cooperation on the issue and suggests deepening the cooperations through professional discussions.

2. The council needs to address the following issue in advance of the preparation process of the European army:

1) The task of the potential European army;

2) The role of the European army compared with member states’domestic standing army;

3) Measures to ensure its capability against various types of security problems.

This country would like to take up a positive role in the council to promote the process of the creation of the European army and to contribute in all possible means to settle the issue.

3. To establish effective institutions to ensure the peaceful use of the European army. The council should consider the following issues:

1) Civilian control over the army;

2) Allowing different scale of contributions from different member state while maintaining it as a multinational army.

On the issue of devising European defense community as an institution responsible for Europe’s security based on the Lisbon treaty, this delegation holds a positive attitude towards the idea while being aware of the upcoming difficulties. Therefore this delegation cautiously proposes as follows:

1. Regional defense cooperation as the foundation of an EU based universal defense community;

2. To seek progress in various issues about defense cooperation, such as but not limited to:

1) Intelligence sharing;

2) Army coordination;

3) Joint military exercises;

4) Technological cooperation.

3. To establish a series of formal institutions in accordance with the Lisbon Treaty to ensure the gradual development of this community. These institutions may include:

1) Inclusive political arrangement allowing universal participation in the building of the community;

2) Institutions to integrate EU’s common foreign policies and their defense strategies;

3) Flexible strategies that would react to potential internal and external changes of EU.